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Ideas about “Consciousness” in Fifth and Sixth Century 
Chinese Buddhist Debates on the Survival of Death by the 
Spirit, and the Chinese Background to *Amalavijñāna 
Michael Radich 
Introduction 
As is well known, the Chinese Buddhist world in the fifth through early 
sixth centuries was the scene of debates about whether or not some part 
of the sentient being does or does not survive death, to transmigrate and 
reap karmic rewards. Buddhist thinkers were concerned to argue, against 
what seems to have been the default position of their opponents, that 
something does survive death. This should not surprise us, since it was 
understood that otherwise the doctrine of karma was incoherent.1  
A significant thread running through Buddhist contributions to these 
debates is the use of terms meaning “consciousness” for the transmigra-
ting entity. In the present paper, I will explore this aspect of the debates. 
This study is part of a larger project in which I am examining possible 
antecedents to the *amalavijñāna (amoluoshi 阿摩羅識, “taintless con-
sciousness”) doctrine of Paramārtha (Zhendi 真諦, 499-569) in both In-
-------------------------------------------------- 
1 On these debates or parts thereof, see Balazs, 1932; Liebenthal, 1952 (it must be noted 
that Liebenthal’s translations are often misleading; I nonetheless give references to 
them where relevant below, because they are often still the only English translations in 
existence); Hurvitz, 1957: 106-112; Balázs, 1964: 266-276; Forke, 1964: 266-274; Robinson, 
1978: 196-199; Wagner, 1969: 198-207; Chang, 1973; Hachiya, 1973; Schmidt-Glintzer, 
1976; Pachow, 1978; Vande Walle, 1979; Lai, 1981a, 1981b; Nakanishi, 1983; Frisch, 1985: 
106-‌117; Itō, 1986; Liu, 1987; Lo, 1991; Jansen, 2000: 216-217, 235-246; de Rauw, 2008: 
97-123. Further sources cited in Wagner 198 n. 1; de Rauw 98 n. 265. 
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dia and China.2 Through this research, I hope to address possible rela-
tions between *amalavijñāna and the so-called “sinification” of Buddhist 
concepts. Through this case study, in turn, I hope to address larger me-
thodological problems in the study of so-called “sinification” itself. Con-
sequently, I will make a few preliminary remarks in the present paper 
about the significance of my findings as part of the background to *ama-
lavijñāna.  
In the main, however, the present paper will focus on tracing the 
place of concepts of consciousness in the debates in question, from the 
early fifth through to the early sixth centuries; and, particularly, on 
presenting a new interpretation of Liang Wudi’s (梁武帝, r. 502-549) 
Shenming cheng fo yi (神明成佛義, “On the Attainment of Buddhahood by 
the Shenming”) and its relation to its scriptural sources and intellectual-
historical context. The debates on the survival of death, themselves, 
have also sometimes been taken as part of the process of the so-called 
“sinification” of Buddhism. On the basis of my examination of the role of 
the concept of consciousness in those debates, I will also suggest that 
this way of reading the debates is probably misleading. 
As the story is usually told, the debates in question can be traced back 
as far as the generation of Xi Chao (郗超, 336-377) and Dai Kui (戴逵, ca. 
335-396),3 through the writings of Lushan Huiyuan (廬山慧遠, 334-416) 
and a piece by the shadowy Zheng Daozi (鄭道子, d.u.); and then through 
Zong Bing (宗炳, 375-443); He Chengtian (何承天, 370-447); a debunking 
Confucian riposte from Fan Zhen (范縝, ca. 450-515); and reactions a-
gainst the latter, lasting through to the early Liang, including contribu-
tions by Xiao Chen (蕭琛, 478–529), Cao Siwen (曹思文, d.u.), Fayun (法
雲, 467-529), Lu Chui (陸倕, d. 517), Liang Wudi, Shen Ji (沈績, d.u.) and 
Shen Yue (沈約, 441-513).  
-------------------------------------------------- 
2 The first part of this study has already appeared as Radich, 2008. I presented earlier ver-
sions of other parts of the study as Radich, unpublished, at both the 2010 meeting of the 
present project, and the June-July 2011 meeting of the International Association of Bud-
dhist Studies; and as a draft paper at the June 2011 meeting of the present project. I am 
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for Hamburg University Press for suggesting several 
improvements. 
3 See also Itō, 1986: 221-222 for a very interesting early passage, around the time of this 
same generation, from Yuan Hong’s (袁宏, 326-379) Hou Han ji (後漢紀). 
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Before beginning our discussion, I would like first to set aside as mis-
leading the most common label in English-language scholarship for the 
issue at stake in these debates: “the immortality of the soul”. The most 
common phrase used in Chinese is shen bu mie (神不滅) (and variants 
thereon). It is true that this wording implies a limited kind of “immor-
tality”, in that it refers to something that “does not perish/is not extin-
guished” at the moment of a given death, in a chain of multiple lifetimes. 
However, in English, “immortality” typically has the additional connota-
tion of surviving death and then “living” for ever more, and I do not believe 
that this connotation is necessarily entailed by the Chinese Buddhist 
claims under discussion. In addition, to translate “soul” for shen is per-
haps understandable, but I believe that the Chinese has stronger conno-
tations of the mental component in the human being (as in the opposi-
tion between shen [神] and xing [形], roughly “mind” and “body”) than 
“soul” has, at least to the ears of modern English speakers. In an attempt 
(doubtless fated to be less than perfectly successful) to avoid some of 
these connotations, I will speak instead of the “survival of death” by the 
“spirit”.4 
The debates on the survival of death can be regarded as part of the 
background to *amalavijñāna in two respects: in terms of the general out-
line of the Chinese Buddhist views at play; and more specifically, in 
terms of certain key terminology that appears in places in the relevant 
texts. 
In more general terms, I believe that we must be careful not to exag-
gerate the similarities between the general contours of the ideas at stake 
in this debate, and of *amalavijñāna doctrine. In particular, we must avoid 
a simplistic interpretation of the “immortality of the soul” debates (the 
popularity of this term to label the debates is itself indicative of the 
problem I have in mind) that sees in them a Chinese failure to under-
stand basic Buddhism, and a lapse into heterodox “ātmavāda”. For a start, 
-------------------------------------------------- 
4 The phrase “survive death” might sound oxymoronic. Throughout this paper, however, 
following the usage in my primary materials, I use the phrase “survive death” to indi-
cate that the pertinent part of the sentient being is understood not to be destroyed by 
death. On one occasion, the Ch. Dhammapada even states that “spirit does not die” (shen 
bu wang 神不亡, T4:210.574b4). Typically, in these contexts, texts understand “death” 
to be primarily a corporeal matter, i.e. something that happens to the body. 
474 Radich  
 
as we will see in part here, there was a sound basis in translated Buddhist 
scriptures (or texts that appeared as such to Chinese readers) for the 
notion that some constituent of the person does transmigrate (this con-
stituent was often called “consciousness”). More broadly, as I hope to 
show elsewhere – and indeed as should be well known – it is not apostasy 
for Buddhists to admit some kind of notional hook on which to hang the 
idea of such continuity across multiple incarnations (e.g. saṃtāna, saṃtati, 
karma – and, of course, concepts closer to the heart of the present study 
like gandharva and vijñāna itself). Second, the terms at issue (shen etc.) are 
not personal pronouns, nor words that were used in Chinese to denote 
the ego, identity or self-understanding of the person; other such terms, 
which did exist, were avoided (we will touch below on one such term, 
shenwo 神我). Rather, as I have already mentioned, shen has overtones of 
the mental constituent in the human constitution. Third, we must re-
member that all polemical utterance is “targeted”, that is, it is molded to 
the contours of the position it aims to refute. In this case, the Buddhists’ 
opponents propounded an absolute extinction of the person at death, 
and the concomitant discontinuity of moral responsibility beyond the 
frame of a single earthly lifetime. Against this, in order for basic Bud-
dhist concepts to cohere and prevail, it was necessary to argue that there 
was indeed some thread of continuity between multiple rebirths, and 
this is what shen and related notions achieved (retooled for the purpose 
from the uses they served in the older Chinese background). Thus, Chi-
nese assertions that a shen survived death had a stronger warrant in 
Indic Buddhist materials, and are less necessarily congruent with doc-
trines supposedly “heterodox” to Indian Buddhism, than prior scholars 
have often assumed. 
With these caveats, we can still recognize that a few key features of 
the Chinese Buddhist views formed and displayed through these debates 
anticipate *amalavijñāna doctrine. The putative transmigrating entity in 
question is said to be mental; it is a thread of continuity between succes-
sive incarnations; it becomes entangled with the phenomenal world 
through ignorance; and sometimes, it is depicted as a kind of “subject” of 
liberation. In all of these respects, the surviving component of the per-
son, by whatever name, has structural similarities to vijñāna as it fea-
tures in *amalavijñāna doctrine and its contexts.  
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On occasion, however, a more specific set of terms was used that 
brings us closer to meaningful antecedents to *amalavijñāna doctrine. In 
particular, we can trace a subset of contributors to the debate who use 
“consciousness” (shi 識) in a recognizably Buddhist sense, or shishen (識
神, “consciousness-cum-spirit”)/shenshi (神識, “spirit-cum-conscious-
ness”) to refer to the transmigrating entity in question.5 
Lushan Huiyuan 
We turn first to Huiyuan, who is often treated as the starting point of the 
debate (though, in fact, the issue is clearly older than his time; Nattier, 
2008: 127 and n. 42; Zacchetti, 2010).6 Oddly, perhaps, the most interest-
ing thing about Huiyuan’s writings, for us, is that terms for conscious-
ness appear not to feature in his discussion of the problem of survival of 
death,7 even though, by his time, texts existed in which the connection 
between that problem and consciousness was available for use. This 
perhaps indicates that even learned Chinese Buddhists embroiled in the 
-------------------------------------------------- 
5 Many key figures in the broader debates, as usually treated in more general scholarship, 
do not mention “consciousness” in the sense that interests us here. We therefore set a-
side texts by such figures as Luo Han (羅含, d. after 373?); Huilin (慧琳, d.u.); He Cheng-
tian; Fan Zhen; Xiao Chen; and Cao Siwen. Park (2012) includes the most extensive pub-
lished research to date on the term shenshi/shishen; however, the book did not appear 
until after the present study was finalized. Cf. Radich (2013). 
6 I am currently preparing a companion to the present study examining some of this pre-
history, in particular reference to terms for consciousness (Radich, in preparation). 
7 A cursory search through Huiyuan’s writings seems to indicate, in fact, that Huiyuan 
only ever uses shi as an ordinary verb meaning “know” etc., or an ordinary noun mean-
ing “knowledge, intelligence”. In some instances, the term is difficult to understand 
(see e.g. HMJ T52:31c10, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:286, 290 n. 29; Kimura, 1960-1962: “Texts 
and Translations” 394-395 n. 29). The overall pattern of Huiyuan’s use of the word, how-
ever, makes it implausible to me that in this instance only does he mean to refer to the 
vijñānaskandha. In one instance, Huiyuan does say that when the spirit takes up resi-
dence in the body, it “jin chang ming shi” (津暢明識) (“Letter to Huan Xuan”, HMJ T52:
33b13, Makita 2:310, Liebenthal, 1952: 358). However, this phrase is difficult to interpret: 
Does it mean “permeates [the body] and illuminates it with consciousness”? – or “per-
meates [the body] and brings consciousness to awareness”? – or (with Makita), “the 
clear function of consciousness springs from [the body in which the spirit has lodged]”? 
– or (with Guo, 2007: 309) “provid[es] a smooth conduit for bright awareness”? 
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thick of the debates took some time to discover those resources and de-
ploy them accordingly. 
Zheng Daozi 
At the next discernible stage, in Zheng Daozi, we find a curious situation: 
the term “consciousness” is only used by the opponent, and not by 
Zheng himself. From the outset of the essay, the opponent frames his 
questions in terms of consciousness (shi 識) (among other terms), refer-
ring to the concept three times.8 It is difficult to know what to make of 
this fact, partly because of difficulties in dating the text; however, if it is 
as early as Liebenthal thinks,9 it may represent the first mention of con-
sciousness in these debates. Again, the fact that consciousness enters 
almost through the back door, so to speak – in the mouth of an opponent 
– may indicate that the Buddhists who spoke on behalf of Buddhism in 
the debates had not yet realized the potential use of the term in defen-
ding their claims. 
Zong Bing 
We finally see the connection between the transmigrating entity and 
consciousness clearly made in Zong Bing’s Ming fo lun (明佛論). It is clear 
-------------------------------------------------- 
8 “Most hold that the body and spirit perish together, and that illumination and con-
sciousness are extinguished in tandem” (多以形神同滅、照識俱盡; HMJ T52:27c29, 
Makita, 1973-1975: 2:251, Liebenthal, 1952: 346-347); “Not only would there be nothing 
on the basis of which to establish speech, there would also be nothing on the basis of 
which to establish consciousness; and if consciousness is not established, upon what 
will spirit depend?” (非但無所立言、亦無所立其識矣。識不立則神將安寄; 28a25-26, 
Makita 2:253, Liebenthal 348); “…that grasses and trees have neither spirit nor con-
sciousness” (草木之無神無識; 28b12-13, Makita 2:255, Liebenthal 349). The only in-
stance of shi outside utterances of the opponent is in a simple verbal sense meaning “to 
know”: “…does not know benevolence and righteousness” (bu shi ren yi 不識仁義; 
29a14-15, Makita 2:260, Liebenthal 353). 
9 Forke proposes that “Zheng Daozi” may have been Zheng Daozhao (鄭道昭, d. 516) 
(Forke, 1964: 265-266). However, Liebenthal suggests the earlier Zheng Xianzhi (鄭鮮之, 
364-427) (Liebenthal, 1952: 346-354). 
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that at least in places, Zong Bing uses shi (識) to mean vijñāna in a specifi-
cally Buddhist sense, as a member of the twelvefold nidāna chain and a 
key link in the process of reincarnation.10 According to Zong Bing, rein-
carnation occurs because the continued functioning of mind keeps vijñā-
na active, so that successive vijñānas follow one after another (presuma-
bly, through multiple lifetimes) (Hong ming ji [hereafter “HMJ”] T52:11
a16-17, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:98, Liebenthal, 1952: 392-393). “The struc-
ture [comprising] saṃskāra and vijñāna [ensures] the subtle continuity 
between new and old [lifetimes]” (情識之搆既新故妙續, HMJ T52:11a18-
19, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:98, Liebenthal, 1952: 393; cf. Makita 2:317 n. 6). 
However, this vijñāna, described as “the vijñāna that thinks and con-
structs” (siying zhi shi 思營之識), is missing in the enlightened being, 
who possesses (or is) only shen (神); and liberation is described as a pro-
cess whereby saṃskāra and vijñāna cease (upon the cessation of mental 
functioning), and the shenming (神明, “spirit-cum-awareness/illumina-
tion”; see below) is complete (HMJ T52:11a12-18, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:98, 
Liebenthal, 1952: 393).11  
Zong Bing further explains the relation between vijñāna and the 
approach to awakening by the old analogy of a mirror obscured by dust, 
where vijñāna is the dust: just as a mirror can be obscured by a thin or a 
thick layer of dust, so spirit (shen 神) can be obscured by fine or coarse 
vijñāna, which “sticks” (fu 附) to spirit and obscures its original nature 
(like the “original brightness” [benming 本明] of the mirror). However, 
practicing (contemplation of) emptiness works to reduce the layer of ob-
scuring vijñāna, and when it is eliminated entirely, “original spirit” (ben-
shen 本神) is consummated (qiong 窮). The resulting state is nirvāṇa 
(HMJ T52:11b1-7, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:100, Liebenthal, 1952: 394).12  
-------------------------------------------------- 
10 E.g. “Now, intention[?] and other saṃskāras combine interdependently to constitute 
vijñāna, and vijñāna precipitates the formation of nāmarūpa” (夫億等之情，皆相緣成識，
識感成形), describing the process of taking a new incarnation, where qing (情), shi (識) 
and xing (形) are saṃskāra, vijñāna and nāmarūpa respectively (HMJ T52:11a9-10, Makita, 
1973-1975: 2:97, Liebenthal, 1952: 392). 
11 See n. 61. This remarkable passage does much to anticipate Liang Wudi, and we will 
return to it below; see p. 499. 
12 Note the overtones here of the “return to the origin” motif. 
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In one or two places, further, Zong Bing also discusses consciousness, 
as the subject of transmigration, in a manner that seems to connect it to 
Buddha-nature, or, more broadly, to the possibility of attaining buddha-
hood – another respect in which he breaks new ground. (Recall that the 
Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra [hereafter “MPNMS”], which more or less in-
troduced “Buddha-nature” to a Chinese readership, had only been trans-
lated a decade or two before Zong Bing wrote.) For instance, Zong Bing 
says that it is in virtue of the fact that the unperishing spirit (shen 神), 
transmigrating through multiple lifetimes, contains awareness (shi 識, 
“consciousness”, here conceivably simply “knowledge”) of Yao[’s virtue], 
that it is ultimately possible to become Buddha (今以不滅之神含知堯之
識…由此觀之，人可作佛，其亦明矣; HMJ T52:10b25-c1, Makita, 1973-‌
1975: 2:92; Liebenthal, 1952: 387-388). In the most striking passage in this 
respect, he says:  
If consciousness (shi 識) can make lucid (cheng 澄) the origin (ben 本) 
that does not become extinct (bu mie 不滅, [i.e. survives through va-
rious incarnations]), and accept the learning/practice that daily re-
duces, “reducing ever more day by day, until it necessarily arrives at 
non-action”,13 then it will no longer have any greedy passionate im-
pulses (yuyu qing 欲欲情),14 so that only the spirit (shen 神) shines, 
and there will then be no more rebirth. Where there is no rebirth, 
there is no body; and where there is no body but there is still spirit, 
we term it dharmakāya (識能澄不滅之本，稟日損之學，「損之又損，
必至無為」，無欲欲情，唯神獨映，則無當於生矣，無生則無身。
無身而有神，法身之謂也; HMJ T52:10c7-10, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:93-
94; Liebenthal, 1952: 388).  
-------------------------------------------------- 
13 Laozi 48: 損之又損、必至無為 (Chen, 1987: 250, Lau, 1963: 109). Zong Bing refers to 
this model again elsewhere (HMJ T52:14a23, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:126). 
14 Liebenthal notes that from Huiyuan onward, Chinese Buddhists of this era saw in qing 
(情) the motive power that drove reincarnation (he translates “will to live”), making it 
something like saṃskāra (Liebenthal, 1952: 388 n. 249). Cf. the passage cited above n. 10, 
where the equivalence to saṃskāra seems clear. 
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This passage is also notable because it features the motif of the return to 
the origin, and also (though in quite unusual terms) of the luminosity of 
liberated mind (“so that only the spirit shines…”). 
It is of interest to note that Zong Bing also emphasizes a kind of rough 
idealism, i.e. the doctrine that all dharmas are created by mind, citing the 
Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa and a Dhammapada verse already connected with the 
Yin chi ru jing (HMJ T52:11a3-6, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:95-96, Liebenthal, 
1952: 391-392);15 and, in the same passage, emphasizes “purification of 
mind” (qing xin 清心) (though here as a means to rebirth in a “wondrous, 
glorious realm”, not to final liberation) (HMJ T52:11a6). 
In sum, Zong Bing represents an important watershed in the develop-
ments we are tracing. He specifically makes vijñāna the thread of conti-
nuity in transmigration; he discusses it, implicitly, in terms of the remo-
val of defilements, through the analogy of the mind as a mirror; he may 
include inklings of a connection to Buddha-nature, or the potential of at-
taining buddhahood; and he links his ideas to the claim that all that ex-
ists is mind only. 
An anonymous Liu Song text 
A next important step is found in a brief, anonymous Liu Song text (per-
haps by Huiguan 惠觀, d. 443-447?) (X77:1523.354a8-b7).16 This essay 
-------------------------------------------------- 
15 Citing Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa verbatim from Zhi Qian’s translation (T14:474.523a25), Skt. 
sarvadharmāś cittaparikalpenôtpadyante (Study Group, 2006: 30; cf. Makita 2:97 n. 29); 
and Dharmapada (心為法本, T4:210.562a13, a15, T4:211.583a7, a9, T4:212.760a11, a21, 
b9, b11, Dhammapada 1.1, 1.2, Udānavarga 31.23, 24, Pāli manopubbaṅgamā dhammā, Skt. 
manaḥpūrvaṅgamā dharmā, Mizuno, 1981: 1:82-83). For the Yin chi ru jing use of the 
Dhammapada passage, see T33:1694.10a12-14 (Lai, 1986: 87; and Radich, in preparation). 
16 This short essay has been preserved in Sōshō’s (宗性, 1202-1278) Meisō den shō (名僧傳
抄) X1523, which excerpts Baochang’s (寶唱, fl. 502-after 519?) otherwise lost Mingseng 
zhuan (名僧傳). It thus dates before Baochang, at the latest. It appears in a section 
which lists biographies of a number of figures, but there is no notice of which of the 
various figures listed wrote the text that concerns us. Liebenthal therefore seems to be 
conjecturing that the text is by Huiguan, on the basis of the fact that he is among the 
figures listed (Liebenthal, 1952: 396 n. 305; 宋道場寺釋惠觀七, X77:1523.347c2). How-
ever, the figures in question are all from the Liu Song (劉宋, 420-479). We can thus 
tentatively regard the text as dating before 479. The essay is translated in Liebenthal 
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makes an unusual contribution to these debates by denying the doctrine 
of a shen that survives death, but doing so in defense of correct Buddhism 
(usually, Buddhists defend the survival of the spirit against non-Buddhist 
critics). However, the terms used here are different from those usually 
deployed, and show that the author – and it is possibly significant that 
this author was a monastic17 – is attempting to defend a more “correct” 
view, inspired by MPNMS.  
The entity the essay denies is called a shen (眾生…無常住之神, X77:
1523.354a16), but also, tellingly, a shenwo (神我, “spirit-ātman”) (four 
times at X77:1523.354a8-15). This shows clearly that the author is con-
cerned about ātmavāda heresy. By the time this text was written, shenwo 
had emerged in Chinese Buddhist contexts as a technical term for the 
ātman. The use of this term may also have recalled to contemporary 
readers’ minds the discussion in SA 196 (corresponding to the MN Aggi-
vacchagotta-sutta) of whether or not a sentient being has a shenwo that 
exists after death (the use of the term shenwo here is unique in the Chi-
nese Āgamas).18 It also features in this role in such seminal texts as the 
*Tattvasiddhi (which was the focus of intense scholastic activity in this 
-------------------------------------------------- 
396-397, but the translation is short, and so I will not cite Liebenthal at each instance 
below. 
17 Although the author is unknown, we know he was a monastic because his views are 
reported in the context of monastic biographies; see n. 16 above. 
18 The question is put by a figure called in Chinese *Vatsaputra (Duzi 犢子, Pāli Vaccha-
gotta), a name which might also have associated these doctrines, and the text, with 
the Pudgalavādins (especially the Vātsīputrīyas [duzibu 犢子部]; cf. n. 21 below) 
(Priestley, 1999: 34-36; on possible connections between *amalavijñāna doctrine and 
pudgalavāda, see Radich, unpublished). *Vatsaputra asks: “Does the shenwo of the sen-
tient being, that dies here and is born there [in a next or other world], exist or not, or 
does it both exist and not exist, or does it neither exist nor not exist?” (眾生神我、死
此生彼、為有為無、亦有亦無，非有非無，非非有非非無; T2:100.445a18-19, cf. 445b1-3). 
In the parallel Aggivacchagotta-sutta MN 72, these questions correspond to questions 
about the “tathāgata” (PTS MN I:484-486, Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi, 1995: 591-592; cf. also 
SA no. 202, 448c6-7; paralleled in Kiṃdiṭṭhika [Diṭṭhi], PTS AN V:186, Woodward and 
Hare, 1995: 5:128). Woodward (128 n. 2) notes that the Pāli commentary interprets ta-
thāgata here as “just a being” (cf. Cone, 2001-2010: 2:286 s.v. tathāgata, citing the pre-
sent passage and others using roughly parallel formulae; also Anālayo, 2011: 1:391 and 
n. 13). Thus, the SA translation as “sentient being” may not be discrepant.  
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period, alongside MPNMS);19 commentaries on MPNMS (collected in the 
Da banniepan jing ji jie 大般涅槃經集解, hereafter “DBJJJ”) by Fayao (法
瑤, fl. ca. 423-462),20 Sengzong (僧宗, 438-496)21 and Baoliang (寶亮, 
444-509) (who mentions the concept by far most frequently out of these 
three authors);22 and a few other texts.23 In many of these contexts, it is 
clear that shenwo corresponds to ātman (as a concept that heretics pro-
pound, and Buddhism denies). In MPNMS commentaries, it is also some-
times opposed (as here) to Buddha-nature (as a “true” self), and dis-
cussed in distinction to it.  
The predicate denied of shenwo in the essay under discussion is not 
“extinction” (mie 滅), as is more usual, but “eternity” or “permanence” 
(chang 常, *nitya), echoing the preferred phraseology of the MPNMS. 
Against this false construct, the essay opposes Buddha-nature (foxing 佛
性) and simply buddha (fo 佛), which is said to be the “true self” (zhenwo 
真我), in terms again redolent of MPNMS (X77:1523.354a9, 354a11, etc.).24  
-------------------------------------------------- 
19 T32:1646.254b19 – clearly corresponding to ātman (Katsura, 1974: 22, 36); also 323b15; 
363b10; 372c3-4. 
20 DBJJJ T37:462b16-19, distinguishing between Buddha-nature and the false ātman. 
21 Clearly referring to Pudgalavādins (duzi daoren 犢子道人, 460a13-14; also 577a13). 
22 Opposed (by Baoliang) to Buddha-nature as the “true” self of MPNMS (DBJJJ T37:447b
19-20); distinguishing between the case of the ordinary sentient being and that of the 
Buddha (459a13-18, 459b5-8; see also 443b21; 491a10; 524c6; 548c17-23; 577a15, a18).  
23 In the *Bodhisattvabuddhānusmṛtisamādhi (Pusa nian fo sanmei jing 菩薩念佛三昧經), 
trans. *Guṇabharman? (功德直, fl. ca. 462) (T13:414.801a7-9); Kumārajīva’s Qian fo yin-
yuan jing (千佛因緣經) (seemingly with reference to a “Vedic” ātman) (T14:426.71b5-
8); and in the *Upāyahṛdaya (Fangbian xin lun 方便心論) ascribed to Jijiaye (吉迦夜, fl. 
ca. 472) (T32:1632.24b18-23) (Tucci back-translates *ātmabhāva, Tucci, 1929: 9.7). The 
term also appears in the Scripture of Brahma’s Net (Fan wang jing 梵網經) (composed in 
China in this same period) (T24:1484.998c17-19, 999c27-1000a3). 
24 Outright discussion of the “true self” is relatively unusual even in MPNMS itself, but 
see the following passages: “The ‘true self’ now expounded by the Tathāgata is termed 
‘Buddha-nature’” (今日如來所說真我，名曰佛性, MPNMS T12:412c25-26, Yamamoto, 
1973-1975: 1:200) (where nothing corresponds exactly to this phrase in either Faxian 
[法顯, 320?-420?] or Tib.); “Those without the heavenly eye (*divyacakṣus) do not re-
cognize the ‘true self’, and arbitrarily conceptualize it as a self (*ātman)” (無天眼者不
知真我橫計我, 415c17, Yamamoto 1:214; Tib. lha’i mig med pa’i mi rnams kyis ni bdag la 
bdag yod du zin kyang mi mthong ste); (see also 590a20, Yamamoto 3:942; unique to 
*Dharmakṣema, no parallels).  
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In part, as elsewhere, the issue here hinges on the efficacy of moral 
action – phrased in terms of *brahmacaryā (X77:1523.354a14-16). Signifi-
cantly for our purposes, when the essay denies that a shen exists, it pro-
poses instead, as a thread of continuity guaranteeing the efficacy of 
moral acts, “mind” (xin 心). In an echo of a rough “mind-only” doctrine, 
this mind is said to be the factor that governs (or perhaps even creates?) 
“heaven and hell”, i.e. all rebirth destinies (眾生雖無常住之神，而有善
惡之心).25 The essay winds up by puzzling somewhat inconclusively 
over the problem of how mind can secure this continuity between re-
births, when it is also momentary (niannian bu zhu 念念不住; X77:1523.
354a19-20). In this detail, this small essay may constitute a key step in 
the development of the ideas we are tracing here (or at least reflect such 
a key turning point, which might also have been more broadly current in 
texts lost to us): as we will see immediately below, the problem of the 
relation between a momentary (surface layer of) mind and an underlying 
constant substratum is pivotal to the important essay by Liang Wudi, 
who may have been in part reacting to the ideas seen here.  
This short essay is also important because for the first time, it clearly 
connects these debates to MPNMS and the doctrine of Buddha-nature. In 
so doing, it also connects the “entity” in question more clearly than pre-
viously to the problem of becoming Buddha, as well as that of ordinary 
transmigration and the efficacy of ordinary karmic action. 
Liang Wudi and Shenji’s Shenming cheng fo yi, and its contexts 
These ideas reached a watershed in the time of Emperor Wu of the Liang 
dynasty. Soon after coming to the throne (between 502 and 508), Wudi is 
supposed to have written a very short treatise entitled Shenming cheng fo 
yi (神明成佛義, “On the Attainment of Buddhahood by the Shenming”, 
-------------------------------------------------- 
25 This xin is, moreover, the “master” (or source?) (zhu 主) of all conditioned things, the 
“root” (ben 本) of rebirth in the five destinies, etc. (善惡之心為萬行之主，天堂地獄
以心為本, X77:1523.354a16-18).  
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HMJ T52:54a8-c20),26 which is accompanied in HMJ by learned interlin-
ear notes by Shen Ji. Much about this text, as I will demonstrate below, is 
representative of broader trends in the Buddhist thought of its time, and 
the essay is thus a useful lens through which to examine an important 
phase in the history that concerns us here.  
In both the text and commentary of Shenming cheng fo yi, we see two 
broad developments. First, for the first time in these debates, we see the 
influence of the wave of *Tattvasiddhi and MPNMS scholarship that fa-
mously swept the south in the fifth through sixth centuries.27 We also 
see consciousness linked much more closely to the problem of attaining 
buddhahood, and to Buddha-nature more specifically. However, in order 
to fully appreciate the ideas espoused by Wudi and Shen Ji, it will be 
necessary for us to look more closely than previous scholars into the 
scriptural background of their work, especially in MPNMS and the 
Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda-sūtra (hereafter “Śrīm”); and its more immediate 
historical background in the exegetical scholasticism of their time. 
Wudi uses the term shenming (神明, “spirit-cum-awareness/illumina-
tion”)28 for the single, fundamental ground of all the mind’s various 
“functions” (yong 用), which is unchanging (夫心為用本，本一而用殊。
殊用自有興廢，一本之性不移…一本者，即無明神明也; HMJ T52:54b19-
21, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:478, Lai, 1981b: 172). Throughout his essay, he 
also calls this mental instance simply “mind” (xin 心). However, Wudi 
approaches this “undying” entity with a new question: “Who achieves 
buddhahood?” (shui cheng fo hu 誰成佛乎, HMJ T52:54b14, Makita, 1973-
-------------------------------------------------- 
26 On the title and date, see Itō (1986: 229). In addition to Makita (1973-1975), translations 
are found in Itō (1978: 233-244), and Liebenthal (1952: 376-378), but I will not cite them 
for every reference below. 
27 In fact, Nakanishi has usefully suggested in passing that we might see a central thrust 
behind Wudi’s essay as issuing from the confrontation of an Abhidharmic (thus, in 
Wudi’s context, *Tattvasiddhi-derived) doctrine of the momentariness of mind, and the 
diametrically opposed implication that mind must be permanent or eternal, which 
arises as soon as we identify MPNMS’s Buddha-nature with mind (Nakanishi, 1983: 
118). 
28 As we will see below, this term is highly ambiguous, and can scarcely be translated 
into English in a way that makes sense of all the various connotations with which 
Wudi employs it. 
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1975: 3:477-478, Lai, 1981b: 171). In answer, Wudi implicitly identifies this 
substrate of mind with Buddha-nature – in part via two references to 
MPNMS (one of which, as we will see, is actually inaccurate, and one of 
which harbors problems of translation!). One of these passages, more-
over, hinges on the notion of the “primary cause” or “cause proper” 
(zhengyin 正因) of the attainment of buddhahood, reference to which, as 
we will see below, helps us contextualize Wudi’s ideas among those of his 
contemporaries.29 Thus, Wudi builds upon the connection to Buddha-
-------------------------------------------------- 
29 “The sūtra says, ‘The mind is the cause proper, which ultimately brings to completion 
the Buddha-fruit’” (經云：「心為正因，終成佛果」; HMJ T52:54b16, Lai, 1981b: 171, 
Makita, 1973-1975: 3:478). This citation is incorrect in the sense that MPNMS does not 
contain these words (Makita 481 n. 12, Liebenthal n. 170). However, Nakanishi has 
pointed out that Wudi’s claim here may be justified in light of MPNMS, which explains 
that the effect (e.g. yogurt) is in an important sense present in its cause, and then says, 
“So, too, with sentient beings: they all have mind, and all things that have mind will 
certainly attain to anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi; it is on the basis of this principle that I al-
ways preach that all sentient beings without exception have Buddha-nature” (眾生亦
爾，悉皆有心，凡有心者，定當得成阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。以是義故，我常宣說一
切眾生悉有佛性; MPNMS T12:524c7-10, Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 2:658; Nakanishi, 1983: 
118). 
In raising the problematic of zhengyin, Wudi seems to be thinking of some part of a 
long discussion in MPNMS (T12:530b26-28 ff.), which opposes “primary cause” (zheng-
yin) to “ancillary cause, supporting condition” (yuanyin 緣因); and most probably, 
more specifically, of the following line: “Noble scion! For this reason, I expound two 
kinds of cause, [namely] cause proper, and ancillary cause. Cause proper is what is 
termed ‘Buddha-nature’. The ancillary cause is the conception of bodhicitta. It is by this 
pair of causes that one attains anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi” (善男子，以是義故，我說二
因：正因、緣因。正因者，名為佛性。緣因者，發菩提心。以二因緣得阿耨多羅三
藐三菩提; T12:533b3-6, Yamamoto 2:697). Thus, where MPNMS says that the cause 
proper of awakening is Buddha-nature, Liang Wudi states that it is mind, implying that 
the two concepts were perhaps somehow interchangeable in his thinking or context.  
Wudi further supports his contention with another verbatim quote from MPNMS 
(this time correct): “That which functions/exists as ignorance transforms itself into il-
lumination” (若無明轉，則變為明 ; HMJ T52:54b18, citing MPNMS T12:411a23, 
Yamamoto 1:294). Oddly enough, the idea for which he cites the passage seems to be 
an artifact of an ambiguous (or even incorrect) translation by *Dharmakṣema 
(Tanwuchen 曇無讖, 385-433), where the original passage may have meant more or 
less the opposite (i.e. that knowledge becomes ignorance): Faxian has, “Because one 
commits karmic [acts] and misdeeds, knowledge is transformed into ignorance” (行業
過故，明非明轉, T12:376.886c7-8); Tib. has, “There is [in fact] no duality in ignorance 
and knowledge; but nonetheless, through the karmic [acts] and evil deeds of sentient 
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nature drawn by the anonymous Liu Song author discussed above, and 
more broadly, also builds further on anticipatory moves in that same 
author, and perhaps even Zong Bing, to connect the thread of continuity 
through transmigration to the “subject” of liberation. 
Wudi also uses the term “consciousness” (shi 識). To some extent, 
both Liang Wudi and Shen Ji treat shi as synonymous with “mind” (xin 
心) (the latter explicitly so, citing the *Tattvasiddhi) (HMJ T52:54b5-6, 
Makita, 1973-1975: 3:487, Lai, 1981b: 171; citing *Tattvasiddhi T32:1646.274
c19).30 We must therefore be careful not to exaggerate the significance 
of this choice of vocabulary. However, the way this consciousness is 
discussed is informed by the new scholastic flavor of Wudi and Shen Ji’s 
writings; central to their discussion is the fact that this consciousness is 
momentary (HMJ T52:54b14, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:477, Lai, 1981b: 171). In 
this detail, too, Wudi’s essay may betray connections with our 
anonymous Liu Song author; but he may also be showing the influence of 
*Tattvasiddhi scholarship and its Abhidharmic categories.  
In his interlinear comments on Wudi’s essay and his Preface, Shen Ji 
speaks of the entity that does not perish at death as both shenshi (神識) 
and shishen (識神) (HMJ T52:54a12-13, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:475, Lai, 
1981b: 170; HMJ 54b15, Makita 3:478, Lai 171; HMJ 54b16-17 [twice], Maki-
-------------------------------------------------- 
beings, precisely knowledge itself is transformed to take on the appearance of 
ignorance,” ma rig pa dang rig pa gnyis su med mod kyi sems can rnams kyi las kyi nyes pas 
rig pa gang yin pa de nyid ma rig pa lta bur gyur te (D Tha 111b). 
Note further that, pace the Foguang dacidian (193 s.v. eryin [二因] (1)), it is clear from 
context that the terms for the two types of cause at issue in the first quote are not the 
same in meaning as shengyin (生因, kāraṇahetu) and liaoyin (了因, jñāpakahetu) (for 
which see Radich, 2008: 125 n. 345); although there is an attempt – typical of MPNMS 
in its creative or confused character – to identify them with those categories (531b17-
19). The problem of doctrines of causation in MPNMS is extremely tangled, but pro-
mises to reward careful study. 
30 Katsura points out that this *Tattvasiddhi passage parallels AKBh 2.34ab, cittaṃ ma-
no ’tha vijñānam ekārtham (Pradhan, 1967: 61, la Vallée Poussin, 1980: 1:176; also paral-
leled in the *Mahāvibhāṣā) (Katsura, 1974: 133). Cf. also shilü (識慮) (HMJ T52:54b25, 
Makita 3:479, Lai 172). 
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ta 3:475, Lai 171).31 In glossing Wudi’s comment that “consciousness” is 
impermanent, further, he states that the “essence of shenshi” (shenshi zhi 
xing 神識之性) is limpid and unmoving (zhanran bu yi 湛然不移, HMJ 
T52:54b15, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:478, Lai, 1981b: 171). When Wudi states 
that mind has a single, unchanging, underlying essence, moreover, Shen 
Ji says that if one removes defilements and impurities, the “fundamental 
consciousness” (benshi 本識) will shine/be clear (陶汰 [var. 沐, Song, 
Yuan, Ming] 塵穢，本識則明; HMJ T52:54b20, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:478, 
Lai, 1981b: 172). This is, moreover, Shen Ji’s reading of the “transfor-
mation” (from ignorance to the liberated state) spoken of in Wudi’s 
second MPNMS quote.32 Similarly, Shen Ji also states, “Illumination is 
[our] fundamental nature, and we are therefore susceptible to becoming 
illuminated; but because consciousness is defiled by objects without, we 
cannot avoid delusion within” (明為本性，所以應明。識染外塵故，內
不免惑; HMJ T52:54b26, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:479, Lai, 1981b: 172). Thus, 
it is clear that for Wudi and especially Shen Ji, consciousness is the trans-
migrating entity, and also the “subject” of liberation.  
Shen Ji’s comments are also the first time we have so clearly seen the 
language of an underlying “clear essence” of mind/consciousness in the 
context of these debates. We will see below that debts to Śrīm in both 
these essays and their wider context make it likely that this trope can be 
connected quite directly with tathāgatagarbha doctrine. Moreover, 
whereas Wudi identifies a generic “mind” as the “cause proper” (zheng-
yin) of buddhahood, for Shen Ji, the cause proper is specifically shenshi 
(略語佛因其義有二：一曰緣因，二曰正因。緣者，萬善是也。正者，
神識是也。萬善有助發之功，故曰緣因。神識是其正本，故曰正因; HMJ 
T52:54b16-17, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:478, Lai, 1981b: 171). Thus, the link 
between consciousness (specifically, rather than a more general notion 
of “mind”) and liberation is drawn closer than ever before.  
-------------------------------------------------- 
31 Note that Shen Ji also uses shi as an ordinary verb meaning “to know”, e.g. “being 
‘insentient’ is not knowing” (匪情莫識, HMJ T52:54b23, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:478, Lai, 
1981b: 172). 
32 See n. 29 above. Shen Ji: 明闇相易，謂之「變」也。若前去後來，非之謂也 (var. 非
「變」之謂, Song, Yuan, Ming, “Palace”) (HMJ T52:54b20-21, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:478, 
Lai, 1981b: 172). 
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Shen Ji also cites a key work of Zhi Qian (支謙, fl. 223-253) as an au-
thority for the claim that “spirit does not perish” (HMJ T52:54b8-9, Maki-
ta, 1973-1975: 3:477, Lai, 1981b: 171).33 This shows that his comments 
have deeper roots than modern scholars have usually recognized in the 
history we are tracing here. In what follows, I will trace in some detail 
other, hitherto largely unrecognized connections between Wudi and 
Shen Ji’s work and three important reference points: Śrīm; MPNMS; and 
the exegetical practice and theories of some of their most important 
contemporaries. In light of these connections, we can see the full signifi-
cance of Wudi and Shen Ji’s use of the concept of consciousness as a pos-
sible antecedent to *amalavijñāna doctrine. 
First, it is significant that a pivotal concept underlying Wudi’s essay – 
namely, avidyāvāsabhūmi (Ch. wumingzhudi 無明住地) – ultimately de-
rives from Śrīm (in Guṇabhadra’s [Qiunabatuoluo 求那跋陀羅, 394-468] 
translation).34 It is natural enough that Wudi would have taken up a key 
-------------------------------------------------- 
33 Makita and Lai were unable to trace this passage; however, it is a verbatim quote from 
Zhi Qian’s Taizi rui ying benqi jing (太子瑞應本起經) (T3:185.475a1-3; noted in Itō, 1986: 
235 n. 6). This passage has partial parallels in the Xiuxing benqi jing (修行本起經) (T3:
184.467a21, cf. Karetzky, 1992: 57); and in Dharmarakṣa’s Pu yao jing (普曜經) (T3:186.
503b1-2) (which is not an independent witness, being drawn from T185; Nattier, 2008: 
127 n. 42). The passage seems to have no parallels in the Lalitavistara, Mahāvastu or 
Buddhacarita. Note that the Taizi rui ying benqi jing also contains other passages that 
could support a similar view (including its very opening, 472c6-9, where the transmi-
grating entity is jingshen 精神; 478b3-6, hunshen 魂神; 479c17-23, where, pivotally for 
our purposes, “mind is the jingshen” 意為精神 and rebirth is explained by the arising 
of consciousness [and saṃjñā?] 識想; Itō, 1986: 219-200).  
34 Cf. Makita (1973-1975: 3:481 n. 16) (which mentions Jizang’s commentary on Śrīm, 
T1744) and Lai (1981b: 377 n. 172) (tracing this rubric only as far as the Pusa yingluo 
benye jing [菩薩瓔珞本業經], where it appears at T24:1485.1022a6-8). Itō (1986: 240 n. 
1) notes the connection to Śrīm, but does not explore it any further (see also Nakanishi, 
1983: 123-125). Aside from Śrīm, the following texts prior to Wudi also mention avidyā-
vāsabhūmi: Guṇabhadra’s Laṅkâvatāra-sūtra (T16:670.510b7-8, 512b17-18, 513a25-27, 513
b10); Pusa yingluo benye jing (T24:1485.1022a6-8); and *Mandra[sena]’s (曼陀羅仙, fl. 
503) Ratnamegha (T16:659.277b21-25). This means that it may not be possible to identi-
fy Wudi’s source for the concept with absolute certainty. However, two factors argue 
in favor of Śrīm: 1) it contains the most extensive discussion of the concept, where the 
other texts largely only mention it in passing; 2) Wudi also mentions the momentari-
ness of ordinary mind, which also features in Śrīm (see below). The Skt. avidyāvāsa-
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concept from Śrīm, given the interest in the text in the period, as indica-
ted by the series of (now lost) commentaries mentioned or cited in Ji-
zang’s (吉藏, 549-623) commentary, the Shengman bao ku (勝鬘寶窟, 
T1744) (Tsurumi, 1977).35  
It is difficult to find a simple, clear translation of avidyāvāsabhūmi into 
English. Āvāsa means “dwelling-place, residence”, and bhūmi has a broad 
range of meanings centered on the notion of “place”;36 basically, then, 
the term suggests a type of ignorance (avidyā) so profound and funda-
mental that it is as if the sentient being has set up residence (āvāsa) in it, 
so that it operates as a “home base” or place of identification, which is 
the point of departure and reference for all of the sentient being’s more 
specific knowledge and acts. We might perhaps translate āvāsabhūmi, 
more loosely, “[ignorance in/of/as] the very condition of existence”.37  
-------------------------------------------------- 
bhūmi is known from citation of Śrīm in the Ratnagotravibhāga (Johnston, 1950: 33-34, 
Takasaki, 1966: 217). 
35 The term *avidyāvāsabhūmi appears nowhere else in HMJ (nor Guang hong ming ji [廣弘
明集] T2103). However, evidence of interest in the concept is seen in such luminaries 
of Wudi’s time as Fayun (who some have suggested might have ghost-written Wudi’s 
essay) (T33:1715.573b3-9; 588a2-3, 603c9-11, 606b28-c5, 654b18-19); Baoliang (DBJJJ T37:
392‌a10, 404c22-25, 526b3-12, 551a4-5, 600b13-14, 611a4); and Sengzong (413b4, 485
a15-16, 551a17); and it appears in the Liang Cibei daochang chanfa (慈悲道場懺法) (T45:
1909.927c4-7, 946b24-25, 947c24-26). 
36 I take bhūmi here to refer primarily not to anything analogous to the more familiar 
bhūmi of the bodhisattva path, but to the “earth”; the text speaks in several passages of 
this fundamental defilement as a kind of soil from which the other particular defile-
ments grow.  
37 Wayman and Wayman (1974) translate by the somewhat impenetrable phrase “nesci-
ence entrenchment”. Exploiting a useful etymological ambiguity in English, we might 
also translate āvāsa as “habitat”, i.e. somewhere that the sentient being “inhabits” (ā/
vas), and say that “dwelling” in this habitat also “habituates” us to commit particular 
defiled (morally harmful) acts (compare the Yogācāra term vāsanā, perhaps from the 
same root). In both these senses, the notion of “habitat” could even be fruitfully un-
derstood on the basis of a selectively retooled use of the term habitus (after Mauss, 
Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu). Thus, *āvāsakleśa might be something like a latent glo-
bal tendency to karmically negative action, including, perhaps most saliently, the very 
basic act of taking rebirth itself; whereas “active kleśas” are explicitly realized acts in-
stantiating that underlying tendency. There are apparent structural analogies be-
tween this deeper layer of defilement in Śrīm and the notion of ālayavijñāna in early 
Yogācāra texts. 
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We realize that Wudi has this concept in mind when he says: 
The coming into being and passing out of being [of things] takes place 
over and above the essence of “ignorance” [non-illumination, wuming 
無明 = *avidyā]. This coming into being and passing out of being con-
sists in the various functions [of fundamental “ignorance”], but the 
character (yi 義) of mind qua “ignorance” (wuming) remains un-
changed. However, there is a danger that, seeing the variety in its 
functions, [people] will say that mind passes out of existence along 
with its object (jing 境, *viṣaya). For this reason, the term “dwelling-
place” (zhudi 住地, *āvāsabhūmi) is added immediately after the word 
“ignorance” (wuming). This shows that “ignorance” is identical with 
shenming (神明), and the nature (xing 性) of shenming is unchanging.38 
In his interlinear comments, Shen Ji reiterates the same point: “By at-
taching [the term] ‘dwelling-place’ to ‘ignorance’, the intention is to 
chastise those whose minds are muddled; but fools who are full of doubts 
have never understood this [point].”39 In other words, both writers seem 
to have had in mind some text (other than their own) in which wuming 
appeared together with the term zhudi (住地) = āvāsabhūmi.  
Śrīm discusses this avidyāvāsabhūmi at some length (T12:353.220a1-c7, 
Ogawa, 2001: 189-191, Wayman and Wayman, 1974: 84-89). It is presented 
as one of five āvāsabhūmi, the remaining four of which, briefly, are simi-
lar, existentially foundational defilements through attachment respec-
tively to 1) incorrect views; and 2-4) existence in each of the three 
realms (kāmadhātu, rūpadhātu, ārūpyadhātu). These five foundational de-
filements are the basis upon which “active defilements” (qi fannao 起煩
惱) arise in turn.  
Significantly for our purposes, these “active defilements” are defined 
in Śrīm thus: “‘Active [defilements]’ refers to the momentary (*kṣaṇika) 




reference, see n. 39 following. 
39 「無明」係以「住地」，蓋是斥其迷識，而抱惑之徒未曾喻也 (HMJ T52:54b26-c7, Ma-
kita, 1973-1975: 3:479, Lai, 1981b: 172). 
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一切起煩惱。起者，剎那心，剎那相應; T12:353.220a4-5).40 This gives us 
a clue as to where Wudi gets his concern with the momentariness of 
mind, already touched on above. At the opening of the essay, he says 
(ventriloquizing an imaginary interlocutor):  
The wondrous result [of the path of practice, i.e. buddhahood], the 
ultimate acme of essence, is eternal; but subtle spirit cannot but be 
impermanent. “Impermanent” means that a prior [entity] goes out of 
existence and a latter one comes into existence, without enduring 
even for a kṣaṇa (moment) (妙果體極常住，精神不免無常。無常者，
前滅後生，剎那不住者也; HMJ T52:54b10-12, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:477, 
Lai, 1981b: 171).41  
This leads to the conclusion that each moment of mind (shi, “conscious-
ness”) should differ from its predecessor, and go out of existence toge-
ther with its object; and this in turn sets up the central question of 
Wudi’s tract: “Who becomes buddha?” (若心用心於攀緣，前識必異後者，
斯則與境俱往，誰成佛乎; HMJ T52:54b13-14, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:477-
478, Lai, 1981b: 171). In the argument that he gives in answer to this 
question, Wudi distinguishes between a momentary, changeable, pheno-
menal layer of mental content, and an underlying substrate of the es-
sence or nature of mind – very much as Śrīm distinguishes, in the pas-
sage where avidyāvāsabhūmi features, between incidental phenomenal 
instances of defilement, and underlying, enduring structural conditions 
for it. 
Indeed, the underlying nature of the basic question Wudi uses this 
doctrine to answer (“Who becomes Buddha?” or how buddhahood is 
attained) bears further resemblances to the question at issue in Śrīm’s a-
vidyāvāsabhūmi passage. Śrīm is at pains to stress that the avidyāvāsa-
-------------------------------------------------- 
40 A few lines later, Śrīm clearly says that avidyāvāsabhūmi, by contrast, is dissociated 
from thought (cittaviprayukta) (心不相應無始無明住地, T12:353.220a6). 
41 We should note that the use of technical Buddhist terms, especially transcription 
terms from Skt. like kṣaṇa, is very unusual in the debates we are following here (which 
tend to be dominated rather by reference to non-Buddhist Chinese terms and texts); 
and indeed, Shen Ji feels a need to gloss kṣaṇa. This makes it all the more likely that 
the word kṣaṇa derives from some other textual source that Wudi is taking as the occa-
sion of his argument. 
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bhūmi is by far the most “powerful” of all the āvāsabhūmis (如是無明住
地力，於有愛數四住地，無明住地其力最大 etc. [at some length]; T12:
353.220a9-10 ff.; Ogawa, 2001: 189 ff., Wayman and Wayman, 1974: 84 ff.). 
This difference in power lies in the fact that Arhats, Pratyekabuddhas 
and lower-level Bodhisattvas are capable of destroying the other āvāsa-
bhūmis, and are therefore exempt from ordinary embodiment; but they 
are, nonetheless, prone to embodiment in a “body made of mind” (mano-
mayakāya), and this is because they have not broken the type of attach-
ment to existence constituted by the avidyāvāsabhūmi (T12:353.220a16-18 
ff.; Ogawa, 2001: 189 ff., Wayman and Wayman, 1974: 85 ff.; evam eva bha-
gavann avidyāvāsabhūmipratyayā anāsravakarmahetukā arhatāṃ pratyeka-
buddhānāṃ vaśitāprāptānāṃ ca bodhisattvānāṃ manomayā trayaḥ kāyāḥ 
saṃbhavanti etc., Johnston, 1950: 33-34, Takasaki, 1966: 217). In fact, the 
only power that can destroy the avidyāvāsabhūmi is the awakening and 
wisdom of the Tathāgata (阿羅漢辟支佛智所不能斷。唯如來菩提智之
所能斷; T12:353.220a13-15, Ogawa, 2001: 189, Wayman and Wayman, 
1974: 85). But this means, of course, that the elimination of the avidyāvā-
sabhūmi is the key to the process of attaining buddhahood – precisely the 
problem that preoccupies Wudi. 
Thus, Śrīm – one of the most seminal tathāgatagarbha scriptures – is a 
pivotal reference point for Wudi and Shen Ji’s ideas. We will see further 
below, moreover, that it was also a key reference point for their promi-
nent contemporaries when they discussed closely allied ideas. This alone 
is sufficient to show a close, direct textual link between Wudi’s ideas and 
tathāgatagarbha doctrine. However, comparison with his source in Śrīm 
shows that Wudi’s use of the idea of avidyāvāsabhūmi, and indeed, his use 
of the term wuming/avidyā/“ignorance” itself, seems unusual and proble-
matic at first blush. The problem lies in the fact that Wudi poses a radical 
and startling underlying identity between this “ignorance” and shenming, 
whereas these two terms would more normally look like opposites (一本
者，即無明神明也; HMJ T52:54b21, Makita, 1973-1975: 3:478, Lai, 1981b: 
172; 無明即是神明; 54c5-6, Makita 3:479, Lai 172). This leads us in the 
direction of a second key element among Wudi’s sources, namely MPN-
MS and its Buddha-nature doctrine. 
It is tempting, perhaps, at first, to think that Wudi’s strategy of iden-
tification here is based upon the fortuitous fact that shenming (“spirit-
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cum-illumination”) and wuming (“ignorance”, more literally, “lack of illu-
mination”) contain the same constituent syllable, ming (明, “illumination”, 
“awakening”, “awareness”), and that this furnishes Wudi with a hinge by 
which to join the two. However, Wudi is able to cite scriptural authority, 
again from MPNMS, in support of this identity, so that it is not at all idio-
syncratic (善男子，明與無明，亦復如是。若與煩惱諸結俱者，名為無
明，若與一切善法俱者，名之為明; MPNMS T12:411b17-19, Yamamoto, 
1973-1975: 1:195). It is significant that this quote forms a pair with one of 
his earlier quotes from MPNMS.42 If we back up a little, moreover, the 
MPNMS passage in question as a whole begins by saying (in the Chinese 
Wudi would have been referring to43):  
If we say that conditioned things have ignorance as their cause and 
conditions, then ordinary people, hearing this, will falsely imagine 
the concept of a duality between “illumination” (ming) and “non-illu-
mination” (wuming) [i.e. ignorance]. The wise, however, understand 
that in essence, they are not dual, and that this non-dual essence is 
the true nature [of things] (若言無明因緣諸行，凡夫之人聞已分別生
二法想，明與無明，智者了達其性無二，無二之性即是實性; MPNMS 
T12:410c20-22, Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 1:192-193).44  
-------------------------------------------------- 
42 The present quote caps a long passage (MPNMS T12:411a7-b23, Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 
1:194-195), which is immediately preceded by Wudi’s second quote (see n. 29). The two 
quotes in combination can be understood to refer to the passage as a whole. Remark-
ably, the entire paragraph intervening between the two quotes seems to be an inter-
polation into *Dharmakṣema’s version only of MPNMS; it is absent from Faxian, Tib. 
and Skt. fragments (even though it occurs in the portion of *Dharmakṣema’s MPNMS 
that is generally paralleled by other versions). 
43 It is an important methodological principle, in treating the scriptural bases of Chinese 
developments like those under study here, to distinguish between the way the Chinese 
would naturally have been read by Chinese readers, in Chinese, and what we can de-
termine the original Indic text might have meant before passing through the transla-
tion process. This principle is particularly important in dealing with texts like *Dhar-
makṣema’s MPNMS, where the Chinese is often significantly at variance with other 
known versions of the text. 
44 This is reasonably close to Tib: “The benighted, due to [their] ignorance, maintain that 
there is duality in so-called conditioned things; but the wise know that there is [in fact] 
no duality in the difference [between] ignorance and knowledge;” byis pa rnams ni ma 
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The entire passage that follows (ending with Wudi’s second quote) ex-
plains a series of such non-dualisms, which are taken by the ignorant as 
dual, in light of the paradoxical identity-in-difference of causes and ef-
fects, using the metaphor of various dairy products. (The concern with 
the mysteries of causation, and the elaborate dairy metaphors, are both 
prominent features of MPNMS as a whole.) The connection between this 
problem and Wudi’s concern with the problem of the “cause proper” 
(zhengyin) of buddhahood is obvious. Thus, it would scarcely be an exag-
geration to say that Wudi’s entire essay is a comment on the larger 
MPNMS passage we have identified here, by way of the Śrīm concept of 
avidyāvāsabhūmi as the ultimate impediment to the attainment of bud-
dhahood. 
These echoes of Śrīm and MPNMS help us make better sense of other 
aspects of Wudi and Shen Ji’s ideas. Wudi unpacks the MPNMS non-dual-
ism between ignorance and illumination by saying that there is a surface 
level at which mind merely functions (yong 用) to engage with pheno-
menal objects, whereas beneath this level, there is an underlying sub-
stratum of substance (ti 體) which remains untouched.45 In glossing the 
Emperor’s comments, Shen Ji specifies further that mind/consciousness 
falls prey to delusion because it is defiled by external objects;46 else-
where, he specifies that the reverse process is also possible, and con-
sciousness can be purified of defilements to return to its pristine illumi-
nation.47 The broad lineaments of these ideas should be familiar. They 
bear a close resemblance to the idea of a fundamental purity covered by 
“adventitious defilements” (āgantukakleśāḥ) elaborated in various Indic 
texts (even though the usual, more exact translation terms associated 
with that doctrine are not used here). It is significant, in this light, that 
Wudi’s key MPNMS quotes come from a context where the text is ex-
-------------------------------------------------- 
rig pa’i rkyen gyis ’du byed rnams zhes bya ba la gnyis su ’dzin to | shes rab can rnams kyis ni 
ma rig pa dang rig pa tha dad pa gnyis su med par shes so (D 110b).  
45 See n. 39 above. It is common for scholars to see Wudi’s essay as the first use of the 
ti-yong paradigm in specific Buddhist applications ; Itō, 1986: 241-242; but cf. Nakanishi, 
1983: 114, 128 n. 21. 
46 Passage discussed p. 488 above. 
47 Passage discussed p. 488 above. 
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plaining Buddha-nature (foxing yi er 佛性亦爾, MPNMS T12:411b21-22, 
Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 1:195);48 in fact, immediately following the se-
cond of his quotes, the text goes on to state that the reason sentient be-
ings cannot see their Buddha-nature is that it is covered by adventitious 
defilement (煩惱覆故眾生不見…但為煩惱客塵所覆; Tib. nyon mongs pa 
rnams ni glo bur du byung ba yin te etc.; MPNMS T12:411b23-c1, Yamamoto, 
1973-1975: 1:195-196). Thus, although Wudi’s tract mentions Buddha-na-
ture nowhere, Shen Ji seems to be right when he alludes to it in his Pre-
face as the issue at stake (至於佛性大義，頓迷心路; HMJ T52:54a22-23, 
Makita, 1973-1975: 3:476, Lai, 1981b: 170).49 
Another key context, without reference to which we cannot hope to 
fully understand Wudi and Shen Ji’s ideas, is the ideas of their learned 
contemporaries.50 We have already mentioned the fact that Wudi and 
Shen Ji’s interest in Śrīm (as shown by appeal to the notion of avidyāvāsa-
bhūmi) was fairly typical of this period. This is also true of their concern 
with the problem of the “primary cause”. We saw above that Wudi iden-
tifies “mind” (xin 心) as the “cause proper” of buddhahood, and that 
Shen Ji further specifies that this “cause proper” is shenshi.51 This state-
-------------------------------------------------- 
48 Comparison shows that the last words of the passage are unique to *Dharmakṣema. 
49 As Itō has pointed out, MPNMS contains one remarkable passage that seems to make 
exactly the equation Wudi and Shen Ji are hinting at here: “Again, there is an interpre-
tation that holds that vijñāna is Buddha-nature (shi wei foxing 識為佛性), and that be-
cause of vijñāna as a cause, it is possible to attain the undifferentiated mind of the Ta-
thāgatas. Although the mind and vijñāna of sentient beings is impermanent, the suc-
cession of vijñānas [comprises] an unbroken continuum, and this is why it is possible 
to attain the true, eternal mind of the Tathāgata. It is like [the relation between] heat 
and fire: although the fire is impermanent, heat is not impermanent. So it is, too, with 
sentient beings and Buddha-nature, and this is why it is held that vijñāna is Buddha-
nature” (MPNMS T12:556b17-21, Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 3:800, Itō, 1986: 235 n. 3). The 
context is a passage that argues by turn that all the skandhas are identical to Buddha-
nature, and so the claim for vijñāna, in particular, is not especially significant; none-
theless, it could have been a useful proof-text for Wudi’s claims. In fact, however, the 
passage seems to have disappeared without a trace in the later Chinese tradition, ex-
cept that it is quoted once in Guanding’s (灌頂, 561-632) commentary (X36:659.747c
7-9). 
50 Attention is given to aspects of this problem by Itō (1986), for which see immediately 
below; and Nakanishi (1983: 109-117). 
51 See above n. 29 and p. 488. 
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ment can be further illuminated by reference to the works of eminent 
exegetes roughly contemporary with Wudi and Shen Ji, who also evinced 
considerable interest in the problem of the “cause proper” of buddha-
hood.  
As Itō Takatoshi has shown, evidence preserved in the Silun xuan yi 
(四論玄義)52 reports that Sengrou (僧柔, 431-494) and Zhizang (智藏, 
458-522) declared that the “cause proper” of buddhahood was “mind-
consciousness” (xinshi 心識), which “ultimately becomes the great sage” 
(zhong cheng dasheng 終成大聖, X46:784.601c15-23, Itō, 1986: 226);53 
Fa’an (法安, 454-498) held that the cause proper was mind (xin 心), 
which he contrasted with a deluded *manas (yi 意) and *vijñāna/shenshi 
which are functions and susceptible to change (601c1-3; Itō 227); and 
Baoliang is supposed to have held that “true spirit” (zhenshen 真神) is 
the cause proper (601b20-c1; Itō 227);54 or that the “principle of Thus-
ness” (zhenruxing li 真如性理) is the cause proper, where ordinary mind 
is produced on the basis of a substratum of Thusness (601b15-20; Itō 
227)55 (this view is also supposed to have been shared by Fa’an, Fayun 
and Huiyan [慧琰, d.u.]; 601c4-9; Itō 228). In commenting on MPNMS, 
further, Baoliang connects zhengyin to mind, and in support, cites Śrīm 
on *prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta (DBJJJ T37:447c11-20; Itō 238.).56 Sengzong 
calls shenming (神明) itself the zhengyin (DBJJJ T37:586c20-23; Itō 239; Na-
kanishi, 1983: 112-113; cf. also DBJJJ 454b26).  
-------------------------------------------------- 
52 By Huijun/Hyegyun (慧均, d.u., fl. 574-580s?) (Radich, 2008: 121-122 n. 330). 
53 Huijun’s account of this position includes the notion of “return to the origin” (fan ben 
zhi li 反本之理). 
54 Huijun also ascribes this view to Wudi himself. A related view is ascribed to Baoliang 
by Jizang (T38:1768.237c4-9).  
55 As Itō notes, this position is particularly important in light of the doctrines ascribed to 
the Dilun school. Itō suggests, in fact, that the very term zhenru is very early here, as it 
is usually taken to date from Bodhiruci; of course, there is also a possibility that its use 
indicates that Huijun’s doxographical information has been contaminated by ideas in-
tervening between Baoliang and himself. 
56 The exact terms in which Baoliang connects zhengyin (and yuanyin 緣因) to mind are 
obscure to me: “Both zhengyin and yuanyin are paths of spirit and(?) thought” (緣正兩
因並是神慮之道). 
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As this last comment of Sengzong’s suggests, Wudi’s essay is also re-
presentative of the views of the scholarly elite of its time in the very use 
of its titular concept of shenming (神明). Surprisingly, to my knowledge, 
scholars who have worked on Wudi’s essay have not generally explored 
the background of this term in any depth (but cf. Nakanishi, 1983: 110-
117). One possible remote source of the term is in An Shigao – where, re-
markably for our purposes, it is already used for the transmigrating enti-
ty, in a manner that may sometimes correspond to vijñāna – but this 
single passage is unique in the Āgamas and separated from the period 
under discussion by many years, and so we should probably not make 
too much of it.57 Shenming is also used at least once, in the GSZ biography 
of *Dharmamitra (曇摩密多), as an ordinary word for the spirit or intel-
ligence of a person (T50:2059.342c8-9; translated as seishin 精神, Yoshi-
kawa and Funayama, 2009: 310). In the “apocryphal” “Consecration sū-
tra”, shenming is the name for the transmigrating entity.58  
On the whole, however, shenming, in any sense close to Wudi’s, is a re-
latively rare term in Buddhist texts outside the present debates. By con-
trast, within those debates, it begins to appear in senses more closely re-
lated to Wudi’s as early as Zheng Daozi (shenming zhi ben 神明之本, HMJ 
T52:28a1-3, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:251, Liebenthal, 1952: 347; shenming lingji 
神明靈極, HMJ 28b7-9, Makita 2:254, Liebenthal 349). It is especially 
frequent in Zong Bing. In his “Letter to He Chongtian”, for instance, it 
appears as a general term for spirits; and also in a formulation describing 
liberation as “making luminous the shenming and directing it towards the 
birthless state” (HMJ T52:18a9-12, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:163; HMJ 18c3-5, 
-------------------------------------------------- 
57 Shenming is found five times in a discussion of various reincarnation destinies in Bud-
dhist cosmology in An Shigao’s Daśottara-sūtra, where it corresponds to Pāli satta (Skt. 
sattva); this, in turn, corresponds to a list of “states of consciousness” (viññāṇaṭṭhiti) in 
another sutta (T1:13.239a9-16; PTS DN III:263, Walshe, 1987: 506; PTS DN II:68-69, 
Walshe 228-229).  
58 In a list of things that the faithless do not believe: “They do not believe that when the 
person dies, the shenming is born again” (不信人死神明更生, T21:1331.534b23-24). Ac-
cording to Sengyou, this sūtra was composed by Huijian (惠簡, fl. ca. 457) under the Liu 
Song (Makita, 1976: 14).  
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Makita 2:169).59 One key passage in Zong Bing is particularly telling for 
our purposes; describing accession to the liberated state, the text says:  
The spirit (shen 神) of the sage illuminates [things] in a sublime man-
ner, while remaining free of the [ordinary] consciousness that thinks 
and constructs (無思營之識); this is because when the mind (xin 心) 
withdraws from [association with external] things, only spirit [re-
mains], and nothing more. For this reason, the source of empty illu-
mination (ming 明) endures at all times (lit: “from start to finish”), 
and cannot perish. If, on the one hand, one engages with [external] 
things, and does not maintain unity with the spirit, then even though 
one might have the subtlety of a Yan Hui, one must nonetheless strive 
diligently, “loving benevolence and delighting in mountains” (好仁樂
山),60 [and yet still] falling short and suffering penury. All this is [be-
cause] the function of the mind (xinyong 心用) is consciousness/cog-
nizing (識, *vi√jñā); one function necessarily follows another imper-
ceptibly, so that consciousness after consciousness join in an imper-
ceptible continuum, just as in a fire, flame after flame join in succes-
sion to constitute a blaze. If, on the other hand, one awakens to emp-
tiness and extinguishes mind, then mental functions are extinguished 
and volition and consciousness cease, and then shenming is complete.61 
-------------------------------------------------- 
59 In addition to other Zong Bing passages discussed immediately below, see also, in Ming 
fo lun, HMJ T52:10a1-3 (Makita, 1973-1975: 2:87, Liebenthal, 1952: 383); HMJ 11b22-25 
(Makita 2:102); HMJ 12b13-16 (Makita 2:108); HMJ 14a27-b1 (Makita 2:126); HMJ 15
a12-15 (Makita 2:134); HMJ 16a17-19 (Makita 2:142). 
60 Analects 6.2: 知者樂水，仁者樂山; “Those with wisdom delight in water, those with 




空息心，心用止而情識歇，則神明全矣 (HMJ T52:11a12-19, Makita, 1973-1975: 2:98, 
Liebenthal, 1952: 392-393, Guo, 2007: 240-242). My translation here benefited consider-
ably from consulting Guo, and from suggestions from the anonymous reviewer. Simi-
larly, elsewhere, the phrase “consummated the ultimate limit of the shenming” (qiong 
shenming ji 窮神明極) is used to describe the liberation of the Tathāgata (13c23-26, 
Makita 2:121). 
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Thus, already before it is taken up by Wudi, shenming refers to a key com-
ponent of the mind of sentient beings, which others had already asserted 
survives death, and was in some sense the subject of liberation.  
In comparison to the relatively scant and non-technical ways it was 
used previously, however, the term shenming saw an explosion of techni-
cal usage in the hands of the eminent exegetes of Wudi’s day,62 and it is 
in their writings that we find the most illuminating background to Wu-
di’s own use. 
For example, not only does Sengzong claim that shenming is the cause 
proper, as we just saw above; he also uses it in his explanation of the 
sense in which MPNMS can say that there is a “great self” (dawo 大我, 
*mahātman). If we hold that there is absolutely no self, we fall into the 
extreme of nihilism; if we hold that there is an eternal, unperishing (bu 
mie 不滅) self within saṃsāra, we fall into the opposite extreme of eter-
nalism. Between these two extremes, Sengzong suggests, we should re-
cognize that even though there is no self, “The essential principle is not 
destroyed, and upon the basis of it, the shenming [continues] without be-
ing cut off.”63 Elsewhere, Sengzong uses the notion of shenming as cause 
proper to explain how sentient beings in saṃsāra can be spoken of as 
having “[the Buddha] nature”, even though saṃsāra is impermanent 
(DBJJJ T37:545a13-16).  
Baoliang speaks of shenming as the “ineffable essence” (shenming miao-
ti 神明妙體), and the one, true, unconditioned dharma (DBJJJ T37:488c
13-15).64 He also speaks of shenming as the new knowledge that is taught, 
for the first time, by MPNMS itself (strongly suggesting that he identifies 
it with Buddha-nature); he alludes in this connection to the Śrīm doc-
-------------------------------------------------- 
62 Wang Jing’s (王靖, d.u.) comment seems to reflect this situation: “Opinions are many 
and various about the purport of [the notion of] shenming” (神明之旨，其義多端, HMJ 
T52:66a27; cited in Nakanishi, 1983: 120). 
63 性理不亡，神明由之而不斷也 etc. (DBJJJ T37:459b11-15, commenting on MPNMS T12:
410b18-24, Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 1:191; this passage discussed in Nakanishi, 1983: 
111). 
64 Baoliang also speaks of the shenming miaoti elsewhere (e.g. DBJJJ T37:547a15, and pas-
sages cited below in n. 65 and p. 501); as does Sengzong (519b15-16). 
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trine that saṃsāra is based upon tathāgatagarbha.65 In another telling pas-
sage, Baoliang glosses the idea that buddhahood does not arise ex nihilo 
(非本無今有) with reference to the Śrīm doctrine that saṃsāra is based 
upon tathāgatagarbha, and says that the shenming is the “nature/essence” 
(xing 性) of the cogitating intellect (lüzhi 慮知); saṃsāra only arises be-
cause the shenming becomes entangled in causes and conditions, whereas 
if it can disentangle itself, “the false dies out, and the true remains” 
(DBJJJ T37:521c19-22). Elsewhere, he describes the highest kind of faith as 
faith in the ineffable essence of shenming and the highest [truth?] of 
Thusness (信神明妙體真如之第一; DBJJJ T37:538b3). 
Such relations between Wudi’s essay and its milieu are thrown into 
particularly sharp relief if we examine Baoliang’s comments on exactly 
the main MPNMS passage that I have argued lies behind Wudi’s essay. In 
explaining the opening of this passage, Baoliang says that its non-dualist 
understanding of the relation between ignorance and “illumination” is a 
middle path, which presents things in their true aspect. He then goes on 
immediately to say, “It recognizes the Thusness of the ineffable essence 
of shenming as true reality” (識神明妙體真如為實; DBJJJ T37:460c3-5).66 
Baoliang returns to the topic of shenming in commenting on the passage 
immediately following Wudi’s second quote, in which MPNMS explains 
that Buddha-nature is not seen because it is covered over by adventi-
tious defilements. The terms of his comment closely echo those of Wu-
di’s essay:  
[When MPNMS says,] “Buddha-nature is not a conditioned dharma,” [it] 
means that Buddha-nature, as the cause proper (zhengyin), is not af-
fected by good or bad [actions]; how [then] could it be created? Thus, 
we know that the essence of the shenming, at its fundament, has this 
*dharmatā as its source…If the shenming in all cases arose from that 
which is constructed out of causes and conditions, and it did not have 
this as its essence, how then would it be possible for [the sūtra] now to 
-------------------------------------------------- 
65 自四時經教，無有此言。今大乘了義，其旨始判，得知神明以真俗為質也 etc. (DBJJJ 
T37:489c22-23); 從昔教來，學者未體乎大理，見法未分明。不知身為佛因。今於此
教，識因果性，知神明妙體，生死依如來藏 etc. (528c15-17; cf. also 537a25-26).  
66 I read shi (識) here as an ordinary verb.  
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say that there is a wondrous king of all medicines within the poiso-
nous body? …Thus, we know that [the sūtra] is speaking in reference 
to the cause proper (zhengyin). If it was of the nature of a causal pro-
duct, then that would automatically mean that the principle (li 理) 
would not exist within the poisonous body. On the other hand, we 
also should not make the result dependent upon the cause. If it were 
indeed the case that result is dependent upon cause, then the Śrīmālā-
devī should say “On the basis of saṃsāra, there is tathāgatagarbha;” 
whereas it actually says, “On the basis of tathāgatagarbha, there is saṃ-
sāra” (DBJJJ T37:462a25-b7).67  
Aspects of this comment are admittedly obscure. For our purposes, how-
ever, it suffices to note the following points, which are clear: like Wudi, 
Baoliang understands the key issue to be the “cause proper” of buddha-
hood; like Wudi, he closely identifies shenming with the cause proper; in 
the background, via MPNMS, is the doctrine of Buddha-nature; like Wudi, 
Baoliang links the MPNMS passage to ideas from Śrīm; and as with Wudi, 
his explanation has echoes of the doctrine of the aboriginal purity of 
mind. 
In fact, we even find echoes of Wudi and Shen Ji’s treatment of con-
sciousness/shenshi in Baoliang and Sengzong. For instance, in another 
passage also discussing the “cause proper” (zhengyin), Baoliang speaks of 
a type of “middle path with reference to principle” (li zhong zhongdao 理
-------------------------------------------------- 
67 「佛性非是作法者」，謂正因佛性非善惡所感，云何可造？故知神明之體，根本有
此法性為源…若神明一向從業因緣之所構 [for 稱, reading with the v.l. in the 甲 
m.s.] 起，不以此為體者，今云何言，毒身之中有妙藥王…故知據正因而為語也。
若是果性，則毒身之中，理自無也。復不應以果來依因。若以果來依因者，『勝鬘
經』應言，「依生死故有如來藏；」而云，「依如來藏有生死」. The Śrīm reference is 
to the following passage (from the opening of the *prakṛtiprabhāsvara chapter!): “Birth-
and-death [saṃsāra] is grounded upon tathāgatagarbha, and it is with reference to ta-
thāgatagarbha that it is taught that the ‘original limit’ [? bhūtakoṭi?] is unknowable. O 
Bhagavan! It is because tathāgatagarbha exists that we speak of saṃsāra” (生死者依如
來藏，以如來藏故，說本際不可知。世尊，有如來藏故說生死; T12:353.222b5-7, Ogawa, 
2001: 199-200, 238, Wayman and Wayman, 1974: 104); sati bhagavaṁs tathāgatagarbhe 
saṁsāra iti parikalpam asya vacanāyêti (Johnston, 1950: 73, Takasaki, 1966: 292); however, 
this Skt. may be uncertain, and according to Takasaki, we should read, with Ch. and 
Tib., something more like, “O Bhagavan! It is [only] because there is tathāgatagarbha 
that saṃsāra is a meaningful concept” (Takasaki 292-293 n. 185).  
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中中道) which he sees instantiated in the fact that all [beings] possessed 
of shenshi know in every moment (*kṣaṇa) to avoid suffering and seek 
happiness (pi ku qiu le 避苦求樂),68 and this understanding in them is 
Buddha-nature, as the “cause proper” (DBJJJ T37:545a24-27).69 Again dis-
cussing the “cause proper”, Baoliang reiterates that all [beings] with 
shenshi have an innate understanding of the principle of seeking happi-
ness and avoiding pain (DBJJJ T37:554c28-555a8).70 In another passage, 
the Bodhisattva Lion’s Roar asks (in MPNMS): “If the five skandhas com-
prising the sentient being are empty and do not exist, then who is it that 
receives teachings and practices the path?” (眾生五陰空無所有。誰有受
教修習道者; MPNMS T12:537a28-29, Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 2:714). Com-
menting on this passage, Sengzong paraphrases the problem thus:  
If the essence [= Buddha-nature?] [already] exists within the cause, 
and is enwrapped by ignorance, then [since the progression] from 
cause to result, to eliminate ignorance, is called “practice”, [and] the 
capacity to eliminate ignorance is already [inherent] within [the es-
sence], it is established that it is meaningful to practice the path; but 
if no essence exists within the cause, then there is only arising and 
extinction, which is momentary and impermanent, and even in its 
-------------------------------------------------- 
68 As Nakanishi notes, this phrase (which may well be Baoliang’s own coinage; it is unat-
tested before him) is relatively central to Baoliang’s understanding of Buddha-nature, 
shenming, zhengyin etc. (cf. also DBJJJ T37:447c17, 500b13, 547b10-11, 550a15-19, 555a2-4; 
see n. 69 below). Nakanishi further plausibly suggests that we may hear here an echo 
of Śrīm (also from the chapter on *prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta): “If there were no such 
thing as tathāgatagarbha, it would not be possible to conceive of disgust for suffering 
and hanker after nirvāṇa, or seek it” (若無如來藏者，不得厭苦樂求涅槃, tathāgata-
garbhaś ced bhagavan na syān na syād duḥkhe ’pi nirvinna nirvāṇa icchā vā prārthanā vā pra-
ṇidhir veti, T12:353.222b14-15; Ogawa, 2001: 200, 239; Wayman and Wayman, 1974: 105; 
Johnston, 1950: 36, 73; Takasaki, 1966: 221, 293) (Nakanishi, 1983: 115). 
69 理中中道，即是一切眾生避苦求樂，解正因佛性。夫中道之義，本是稱理之心，然
有神識者，無一剎那心中無有此解 (commenting on MPNMS T12:523b23-24, Yama-
moto, 1973-1975: 2:653). In this same comment, Baoliang also cites Śrīm on *prakṛtipra-
bhāsvaracitta: “This is why Śrīm takes up the topic of tathāgatagarbha and *prakṛtipra-
bhāsvaracitta” (是以『勝鬘經』說出如來藏與自性清淨心, 545b6-7); and says that both 
cause proper and conditions have Thusness as their essence (二因乃同用真如為體, 
545b12-13). This passage is discussed by Nakanishi (1983: 115). 
70 Commenting on MPNMS T12:530b17-19 (Yamamoto, 1973-1975: 2:685). 
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substance, [the sentient being] becomes extinct, [in which case,] who 




The echoes with Wudi’s problematic are obvious: the meaning and na-
ture of practice; and the problem of “Who becomes Buddha?” in face of 
the momentariness of the constituents of the ordinary sentient being. 
Even further echoes of Wudi and Shen Ji are heard when Baoliang says, 
in discussing this same passage, “One intent of this passage is to show 
that it is possible for the sentient being to practice the path, even though 
its shenshi is extinguished from moment to moment” (第一明眾生，神識
雖念念滅，得有修道之義, DBJJJ T37:560b12-13).  
These examples could be further multiplied, but full treatment of the 
background of Wudi’s essay in the Buddhist exegetical studies of his time 
would require broaching unstudied problems in Chinese Buddhist doctri-
nal history, which lie far beyond the scope of this study. Even this cur-
sory examination, however, should suffice to show that Wudi’s essay is 
merely the tip of an iceberg of ideas current in his time, and quite repre-
sentative of contemporary developments. Indeed, as Itō points out, facts 
like those discussed above, and the way Wudi made use of the expertise 
of such leading clerics in other textual projects and on other doctrinal 
issues, makes us suspect that the Shenming cheng fo yi might have been 
written with the input of some of these figures, and even represent a 
kind of collective, official position on the issues it addresses (Itō, 1986: 
239). Hopefully, the above examination will also serve to demonstrate 
that Wudi’s essay has deep roots in scripture, and the scholastic engage-
ment with those sources that animated his Buddhist world; indeed, that 
his essay cannot properly be understood without reference to this 
broader intertextual framework. 
In sum, then, Wudi’s essay, in conjunction with Shen Ji’s more expan-
sive comments, marks a significant new stage in the development of the 
ideas we are examining. These ideas had formed in the hands of the 
learned Southern exegete monks that Wudi gathered around him early 
in his reign, out of the encounter between the topics of earlier contro-
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versies about survival of death, as sharpened by the provocative polemic 
of Fan Zhen, with the new scholastic engagement with the Abhidharmic 
categories of the *Tattvasiddhi, the Buddha-nature and causality doc-
trines of MPNMS, and the tathāgatagarbha doctrine of Śrīm. In this new 
synthesis, the focus is now upon consciousness less as the thread of con-
tinuity between ordinary incarnations, but rather, as the thread of 
continuity between the deluded and the liberated state. The distinction 
between an underlying, substantial or essential ground and a surface, 
epiphenomenal level of functioning in mind allows for an attempted re-
solution of the relation between ordinary momentary vijñāna (in a sense 
apparently indebted to Abhidharma) and an original, pure mind/con-
sciousness which enables liberation and perhaps, by implication, en-
dures into the liberated state. The texts clearly claim that this underly-
ing essential substratum of mind-cum-consciousness is aboriginally pure 
and luminous. Obviously, in this latter dimension of the doctrines, the 
old theme of liberation as a return to the origin endures, even if it re-
mains largely implicit.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the notion of “consciousness” (vijñāna), under a variety of 
labels, but most importantly called shenshi/shishen, became increasingly 
important in medieval Chinese debates about the survival of death. Rela-
ted developments were seen in the use of the broader term “mind” (xin), 
and in the use of the term shenming. This study has traced those develop-
ments, most importantly, through Zong Bing; an anonymous Liu Song 
monastic author; Liang Wudi and Shen Ji; and previously under-explored 
context for the latter in the exegetical scholarship of the late fifth and 
early sixth century, especially Baoliang and Sengzong. These authors all 
ground their arguments more in Buddhist scripture than other contribu-
tors to the debates (including Huiyuan), who, by contrast, had a tenden-
cy to appeal to Chinese classics (with an emphasis on the neo-Daoist can-
on). These developments therefore seem to be linked to an ongoing pro-
cess of increasing engagement with new scriptural sources translated 
around the turn of the fifth century, especially MPNMS, Śrīm and the 
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*Tattvasiddhi; and especially with developments in scholastic comment 
and system-building on the basis of those sources.  
Already from Zong Bing, these authors link vijñāna to the twelvefold 
chain of dependent origination, where, of course, the concept already 
played a pivotal role in theories of the precise mechanism of rebirth (see 
below). Vijñāna was understood by these authors to be a continuum or 
succession of momentary states of mind, a dimension of its significance 
which puzzled our anonymous Liu Song monastic author; the resolution 
of the dilemma posed by survival of death by a momentary entity is a 
central agenda for Wudi. Again beginning with Zong Bing, we see indica-
tions of the trope of a fundamentally pure mind which needs cleansing 
from adventitious defilements, and this aspect of the doctrine merely in-
creases in strength over time as well. Behind this doctrine, we can dis-
cern the shadowy presence of liberation as a “return to the origin”. As 
this dimension of these ideas suggests, from Zong Bing onwards, the con-
cepts of vijñāna and mind in question were not only applied to resolve 
the dilemma of rebirth for ordinary sentient beings, and the continuity 
through successive lifetimes of ordinary karma; they were also connected 
to the problem of liberation, and there was a growing sense in which the 
entities so named figured as a kind of “subject” of liberation. Throughout 
these developments, further, the link to Buddha-nature doctrine grows 
increasingly clear, until in Wudi, Shenji, Baoliang and Sengzong, it is 
made explicit by clear and pivotal reference to MPNMS and Śrīm.  
Previous scholars have often taken these entire debates about the 
survival of death by the spirit as evidence for, and an important part of, 
the “sinification” of Buddhist concepts. According to such a reading, Chi-
nese Buddhists did not appreciate anātman doctrine, and could not un-
derstand the ins and outs of a theory of reincarnation without an 
essence of the person to act as the vehicle of rebirth. They thus wound 
up ironically propounding an “ātmavāda” in the name of Buddhist apo-
logetics; that is, they attempted to convince their skeptical non-‌Buddhist 
contemporaries that a transmigrating person did exist, when the essence 
of Buddhist orthodoxy in India was precisely to hold, controversially, 
that it did not.  
I hope that this study will help to show that such a reading is ex-
cessively simplistic (cf. Nakanishi, 1983: 120-121). First, such arguments 
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typically overlook the fact that key terms in the more sophisticated ver-
sions of the Buddhist position that developed over time were linked to 
vijñāna, not to a “self”, a “person” or any concept directly commensu-
rable with the polemical targets of anātman doctrine. Second, it can be 
shown that important aspects of ideas about vijñāna and related concepts 
in India were directly comparable to important parts of the doctrines of 
consciousness traced in this paper.71 Third, the uses of vijñāna traced 
here through fifth and sixth century debates also have a longer history 
in China than is usually recognized.72 As Itō Takatoshi has suggested, 
these notions may have had their origin in the translation of jātaka/ava-
dāna literature, which required, in the Chinese context, that readers be 
given an explanation of how a person could be “the same” across multi-
ple lifetimes, merely in order that the plotlines of the literature in ques-
tion could be understood (Itō, 1986: 219-200). Examination of these deep-
er roots in Chinese Buddhist texts strengthen the claim that Chinese 
Buddhist doctrines about the “survival of death” could legitimately trace 
their provenance and pedigree back to India; as indeed, as we have seen, 
this is also the case when we more accurately trace the actual scriptural 
sources of the ideas of Wudi and his contemporaries. In this light, it is far 
from certain that we require a hypothesis of “sinification” to account for 
the ideas under study. 
As I mentioned in opening, this paper is intended as part of a larger 
study into the possible background of *amalavijñāna doctrine in both 
India and China, also taken as a case study in the problem of supposed 
“sinification” of Buddhist ideas. The ideas traced in this paper have 
many resonances with the shape eventually assumed by *amalavijñāna 
doctrine: they concern a type of vijñāna, specifically linked to the prob-
lem of rebirth in saṃsāra through the karmic efficacy of defilements; but 
this vijñāna, in a Janus-faced manner, also has an aspect that is directed 
-------------------------------------------------- 
71 The details required to demonstrate this lie beyond my scope here (see Radich, 2008: 
95-97, and studies cited there; to which should be added Vetter, 2000: 66-73, and the 
studies he cites at 68-69). 
72 Demonstration of this claim is once again beyond the scope of the present paper. I ad-
dress this problem in the companion piece to the present article (Radich, in prepara-
tion). 
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towards liberation, which is understood as a purification of an original 
or underlying substrate of the mind, and so has possible connections to 
tathāgatagarbha, Buddha-nature, Thusness, and so forth. I certainly think 
it is true, then, that the ideas traced here could be regarded as forerun-
ners to, and possible influences upon, the eventual formation of *amala-
vijñāna doctrine, as is also true of a number of other ideas current in 
China in roughly the same period, such as the antecedents to “survival of 
death” debates already mentioned; the trope of liberation as a “return to 
the origin”; aspects of the doctrines of the early *Buddhāvataṃsaka com-
mentator Lingbian (靈辯, 477–522) and of the Dilun master Fashang (法
上, 495–580); and so on. By the same token, however, I also hold that we 
can identify similarly ample possible antecedents to *amalavijñāna in In-
dian materials.73 It is therefore not possible to claim simply that *amala-
vijñāna is necessarily either entirely Indian or entirely Chinese (though 
this has been the typical strategy of most scholars who have analyzed 
the concept and its history to date). This leads to methodological reflec-
tions on the ways the problem of the possible “sinification” of Buddhist 







DBJJJ Da banniepan jing ji jie (大般涅槃經集解) T1763 
DN Dīgha-nikāya 
GSZ Gao seng zhuan (高僧傳) T2059 
HMJ Hong ming ji (弘明集) T2102 
MN Majjhima-nikāya 
MPNMS Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra (T374 etc.) 
PTS Pali Text Society 
-------------------------------------------------- 
73 Radich (unpublished). 
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SA Saṃyuktāgama T99, T100 
Skt.  Sanskrit 
Śrīm Śrīmālādevīsiṃhanāda-sūtra 
T Taishō shinshū daizōkyō (大正新脩大藏經). Chinese Buddhist 
Electronic Text Association, 2008. References to the Taishō 
follow the order: volume number: text number. page/regis-
ter/line number. Thus, e.g. T8:225.483b17 is volume 8, text 
number 225, page 483, second register, line 17. I omit text 
numbers when using abbreviated titles, e.g. MPNMS, DBJJJ, 
HMJ.  
Tib. Tibetan 
X Shinsan dai Nippon zokuzōkyō (卍新纂大日本續藏經). Refer-
ences formatted as for T. 
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